|
| | | | |
| | | |
| Stat |
Members: 3645
Articles: 2'504'928
Articles rated: 2609
25 April 2024 |
|
| | | | |
|
Article overview
| |
|
|
The Complexity of Probabilistic Lobbying | | Gábor Erdélyi
; Henning Fernau
; Judy Goldsmith
; Nicholas Mattei
; Daniel Raible
; Jörg Rothe
; | | Date: |
24 Jun 2009 | | Abstract: | We propose various models for lobbying in a probabilistic environment, in
which an actor (called "The Lobby") seeks to influence the voters’ preferences
of voting for or against multiple issues when the voters’ preferences are
represented in terms of probabilities. In particular, we provide two evaluation
criteria and three bribery methods to formally describe these models, and we
consider the resulting forms of lobbying with and without issue weighting. We
provide a formal analysis for these problems of lobbying in a stochastic
environment, and determine their classical and parameterized complexity
depending on the given bribery/evaluation criteria. Specifically, we show that
some of these problems can be solved in polynomial time, some are NP-complete
but fixed-parameter tractable, and some are W[2]-complete. Finally, we provide
(in)approximability results. | | Source: | arXiv, 0906.4431 | | Services: | Forum | Review | PDF | Favorites | |
|
|
No review found.
Did you like this article?
Note: answers to reviews or questions about the article must be posted in the forum section.
Authors are not allowed to review their own article. They can use the forum section.
browser Mozilla/5.0 AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko; compatible; ClaudeBot/1.0; +claudebot@anthropic.com)
|
| |
|
|
|
|
News, job offers and information for researchers and scientists:
| |
REGISTER