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Article overview
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Dynamics of Profit-Sharing Games | John Augustine
; Ning Chen
; Edith Elkind
; Angelo Fanelli
; Nick Gravin
; Dmitry Shiryaev
; | Date: |
25 Oct 2010 | Abstract: | An important goal of cooperative game theory is to understand how groups of
selfish agents can form coalitions, i.e., work together in teams. In this
paper, we study the dynamics of coalition formation under bounded rationality.
We consider settings where each team’s profit is given by a convex function,
and propose three profit-sharing schemes, each of which is based on the concept
of marginal utility. The agents are assumed to be myopic, i.e., they keep
changing teams as long as they can increase their payoff by doing so. We study
the properties (such as closeness to Nash equilibrium or total profit) of the
states that result after a polynomial number of such moves, and prove bounds on
the price of anarchy and the price of stability of the corresponding games. | Source: | arXiv, 1010.5081 | Services: | Forum | Review | PDF | Favorites |
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