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19 April 2024
 
  » arxiv » 1505.4989

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Evolutionary Dynamics for Persistent Cooperation in Structured Populations
Yan Li ; Xinsheng Liu ; Jens Christian Claussen ; Wanlin Guo ;
Date 19 May 2015
AbstractThe emergence and maintenance of cooperative behavior is a fascinating topic in evolutionary biology and social science. The public goods game (PGG) is a paradigm for exploring cooperative behavior. In PGG, the total resulting payoff is divided equally among all participants. This feature still leads to the dominance of defection without substantially magnifying the public good by a multiplying factor. Much effort has been made to explain the evolution of cooperative strategies, including a recent model in which only a portion of the total benefit is shared by all the players through introducing a new strategy named persistent cooperation. A persistent cooperator is a contributor who is willing to pay a second cost to retrieve the remaining portion of the payoff contributed by themselves. In a previous study, this model was analyzed in the framework of well-mixed populations. This paper focuses on discussing the persistent cooperation in lattice-structured populations. The evolutionary dynamics of the structured populations consisting of three types of competing players (pure cooperators, defectors and persistent cooperators) are revealed by theoretical analysis and numerical simulations. In particular, the approximate expressions of fixation probabilities for strategies are derived on one-dimensional lattices. The phase diagrams of stationary states, the evolution of frequencies and spatial patterns for strategies are illustrated on both one-dimensional and square lattices by simulations. Our results are consistent with the general observation that, at least in most situations, a structured population facilitates the evolution of cooperation. Specifically, here we find that the existence of persistent cooperators greatly suppresses the spreading of defectors under more relaxed conditions in structured populations compared to that obtained in well-mixed population.
Source arXiv, 1505.4989
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