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29 March 2024
 
  » arxiv » math.PR/0505608

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Stochastic games with infinitely many interacting agents
Emilio De Santis ; Carlo Marinelli ;
Date 27 May 2005
Subject Probability MSC-class: 82C20; 91A18; 91A25 | math.PR
AbstractWe introduce and study a class of infinite-horizon non-zero-sum non-cooperative stochastic games with infinitely many interacting agents using ideas of statistical mechanics. First we show, in the general case of asymmetric interactions, the existence of a strategy that allows any player to eliminate losses after a finite random time. In the special case of symmetric interactions, we also prove that, as time goes to infinity, the game converges to a Nash equilibrium. Moreover, assuming that all agents adopt the same strategy, using arguments related to those leading to perfect simulation algorithms, spatial mixing and ergodicity are proved. In turn, ergodicity allows us to prove ``fixation’’, i.e. that players will adopt a constant strategy after a finite time. The resulting dynamics is related to zero-temperature Glauber dynamics on random graphs of possibly infinite volume.
Source arXiv, math.PR/0505608
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