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Efficient, Verifiable and Privacy-Preserving Combinatorial Auction Design | | Taeho Jung
; Xiang-Yang Li
; Lan Zhang
; He Huang
; | | Date: |
28 Aug 2013 | | Abstract: | We propose a construction to efficiently and securely compute a combinatorial
auction (also referred as combinational auction) which is able to forbid
participants (both auctioneer and the bidders) from learning unnecessary
information except those implied in the output of the auction. The auctioneer
and bidders are assumed to be untrusted, and they may misbehave throughout the
protocol to illegally increase their own benefit. Therefore, we need to either
prevent the misbehavior or detect the misbehavior. We achieve this goal by
introducing a payment mechanism to control bidders’ behaviors
game-theoretically, and we further introduce a blind signature scheme to let
bidders verify the authenticity of their payment reported by the auctioneer.
Although a third-party signer is involved, he only signs a value blindly (i.e.
without knowing the value) and is also untrusted. Moreover, our construction
requires at most O(mn^2) rounds of the communication between bidders and the
auctioneer where m is the total number of goods and n is the total number of
bidders, and the extra computation overhead incurred by our design is very
efficient. | | Source: | arXiv, 1308.6202 | | Services: | Forum | Review | PDF | Favorites | |
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