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Structured populations facilitate cooperation in policed Public Goods Games | | Gereon A. Kaiping
; Timothy J. Sluckin
; Simon J. Cox
; | | Date: |
13 Mar 2015 | | Abstract: | Societies consisting of cooperative individuals seem to require for their
continuing success that defectors be policed. The precise connection between
punishers and benefits, population structure, and division of labour, however,
remains ill-understood. Many models assume costly "peer punishment" to enforce
cooperation, but results in the economics literature suggest that this
assumption may not be generally valid. In many human and animal societies,
there is a division of labour between a purely supportive majority and a
dedicated minority of police-like enforcers. Here we present several extensions
to the Public Goods Game with punishment which allow for this possibility, and
evaluate their influence on the level of cooperative behaviour. We find that a
structure of separate subpopulations, which only interact through migration of
individuals, can have a strong effect on the evolutionary dynamics of a system
and significantly facilitate cooperation. Forcing defectors to contribute and
enabling fitness transfers to punishers both have a weak positive effect on
cooperation levels. In the presence of group competition, however, evolutionary
effects can paradoxically hinder cooperation. | | Source: | arXiv, 1503.4180 | | Services: | Forum | Review | PDF | Favorites | |
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