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Article overview
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The Intermediate Set and Limiting Superdifferential for Coalition Games: Between the Core and the Weber Set | L. Adam
; T. Kroupa
; | Date: |
30 Apr 2015 | Abstract: | We introduce the intermediate set as an interpolating solution concept
between the core and the Weber set of a coalition game. The new solution is
defined as the limiting superdifferential of the Lovasz extension and thus it
completes the hierarchy of variational objects used to represent the core
(Frechet superdifferential) and the Weber set (Clarke superdifferential). From
the game-theoretic point of view, the intermediate set is a non-convex solution
containing the Pareto optimal payoff vectors, which depend on some ordered
partition of the players and the marginal coalitional contributions with
respect to the order. A detailed comparison between the intermediate set and
other set-valued solutions is provided. We compute the exact form of
intermediate set for all games and provide its simplified characterization for
the simple games, the clan games and the glove game. | Source: | arXiv, 1504.8195 | Services: | Forum | Review | PDF | Favorites |
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